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Abstract
As an element of the Government of Canada, the Canadian Forces are
constrained by many financial and administrative regulations intended to ensure
that public funds are expended judiciously. When these regulations restrict the
acquisition of an improved capability, they may force program managers to
accept a less capable product than could be obtained were only a simple cap on
the total program cost imposed.

The CP-140 Aurora Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation
Project is studied, highlighting specific areas where restrictions upon which
capabilities could be improved or added, rather than simply how much money
could be spent, resulted in program delays and a less capable final product.
Lessons about the problems associated with the acceptance of unsolicited
capabilities in the contract proposal, the necessity of applying up-to-date
standards when designing for the installation of modern equipment, and the
difficulties with the retention and forced integration of old equipment with new,
are identified and discussed. Suggestions are made which will allow future
aircraft modernisation programs to avoid some of the problems encountered by
the Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation Project.
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1.

Introduction
The Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation Project (NFIMP) was

intended to be a low-risk, first major step in the CP-140 Aurora Incremental
Modernisation Project (AIMP). The technical and performance goals of the
NFIMP were modest, in line with the allocated funding and aggressive, complex
schedule of the AIMP. The prime contractor, experienced with similar
modifications in civil aircraft and military helicopters, had proposed a modification
largely composed of proven components and software written in-house by an
experienced staff.

Despite this promising foundation and the hard work of everyone involved
in the program, it fell years behind schedule and was forced to halt prototype
flight testing when the accumulated problems made progressing any further
impossible. Flight testing is expected to recommence in late April 2005 after a
ten-month pause for design changes to be engineered and embodied.

Although the successes and shortcomings of the NFIMP were being
monitored with the intention of applying best practices and lessons learned to
subsequent stages of the overall AIMP, program managers and personnel at all
levels were constrained by the bureaucracy and administrative controls of the
Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence (DND).
Although these regulations were intended to ensure that taxpayer dollars were
1

spent in a prudent and responsible manner, they collectively robbed decision
makers and managers of some flexibility. In the case of the NFIMP, this loss of
flexibility and decreased opportunity for innovation resulted in the DND receiving
less operational capability than it would otherwise have been able to obtain. The
net effect was the Canadian Taxpayer not getting the best value for their money.

Most aspects of the NFIMP were funded under the National Procurement
(NP) Program as obsolescence management activities using funds specifically
allocated for the routine maintenance of the CP-140 fleet. The NP program
prohibited any non-incidental increase in capability. The remaining aspects of
the NFIMP were Capital Procurement (CP) Program initiatives intended to
provide a new capability across all DND aircraft fleets. This created two separate
"accounts" for the program, but dollars could not cross between the NP and CP
portions of the whole.

Specifically, prohibiting program managers from acquiring new or
improved capability with the portion of project funds that came from the NP
ultimately resulted in a less capable final product, much later than originally
scheduled, than had a simple cap on total program cost been enforced.

Three broad lessons learned through the process of preparing for and
flight testing the NFIMP prototype will be discussed within the context of how
limited flexibility in how new or improved capability could be funded reduced the
2

value obtained by the taxpayer. Each supports the declaration above and cites
particular characteristics of the NFIMP design where the prototype exhibited
unsatisfactory performance or unexploited potential:

1.

The DND was unable to provide funding for unsolicited capability

offered by the contractor in their bid. Thus, the contractor was liable for
any additional costs, making these features high-risk areas if additional
engineering was required. The DND contract simply accepted the
capabilities as proposed without additional specifications or requirements
because there was no mandate to include them in the modification.

2.

The DND had a restricted ability to take advantage of the

capabilities inherent in modern avionics, even where there would be a
marginal increase in cost for a significant improvement in capability. This
resulted in new shortcomings in the final modification that did not exist in
the original aircraft.

3.

Retaining a significant amount of legacy equipment in the

modification forced the integration of modern and 25 year old avionics.
This proved to be far more difficult, and thus costly, than forecast, possibly
costing more than simply replacing the legacy equipment with a modern
equivalent where practical.
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After discussing the background of the program, these problem areas will
be examined and recommendations will be made to avoid similar problems in
future programs.

Constraints
It is exceptionally difficult to assign financial costs to many aspects of
military projects. The fundamental absence of profit as a motive in any military
activity means that more esoteric measurands, such as overall operational
capability or a lack thereof, constitute the metrics against which success or
failure of any endeavour may be measured. As such, any attempt to assign a
financial cost to any delays or capability limitations in the NFIMP is beyond the
scope of this effort.

Background
The CP-140 Aurora was Canada's long-range maritime patrol aircraft,
used for surface and sub-surface surveillance and a submarine attack role.
Eighteen aircraft were acquired in 1980. By 2000, the aircraft had become the
Canadian Forces' only strategic surface surveillance platform.

Structural modifications to the airframe were anticipated to extend the
estimated life expectancy of the basic airframe beyond 2015, thus allowing at
least a decade of continued operations. Various cockpit, navigation and mission
systems had reached an advanced stage of obsolescence, whereby "the ability of
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the Aurora to survive and operate effectively beside our Allies [had] eroded
significantly since its introduction to service 20 years ago" (Project Charter,2000).
The objectives of the AIMP were to "address equipment supportability issues and
to provide the Aurora fleet with a modernised operational capability that [would]
permit it to survive and operate alongside our allies" (Project Charter, 2000). The
AIMP had to succeed for the DND to continue to operate the Aurora fleet.

The AIMP was sub-divided into four groups for ease of management.
Contained in the second of these groups was the NFIMP, intended to address
reliability and obsolescence problems in the aircraft's navigation and flight
instrument avionics.

Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation Project
The NFIMP was the second major phase in the overall AIMP. Its
objectives were to:

1.

Replace the current inertial navigation system with an embedded

Global Positioning System-inertial navigation system (EGI), including
control display units (CDU) capable of controlling navigation and
communication parameters.

2.

Replace the flight director indicator and horizontal situation

indicator with new electronic flight instruments.
5

3.

Replace the autopilot with digital components.

4.

Replace the radar altimeter.

5.

Integrate an aircraft collision avoidance system (ACAS).

6.

Reduce the repair and overhaul costs of the aforementioned

equipment (Statement of Work for NFIMP, 2001).

CP-140 Aurora Aircraft
The CP-140 Aurora was described in its aircraft operating instructions
manual as:
… a multi-mission reconnaissance and antisubmarine
warfare aircraft manufactured by the Lockheed-California
Company. Its design incorporated selected features of both the
P-3C Orion and the S-3A Viking. The Aurora was powered by four
Allison T56-A-14 LFE turboprop engines with Hamilton Standard
54H60-77 hydromatic propellers, and was an effective surveillance
platform for both low and high altitude missions, capable of ranges
over 4000 nautical miles and speeds up to 405 knots indicated
airspeed. The aircraft was certified for instrument flight rules flight
and to operate in Minimum Navigation Performance
6

Specification/Canadian Minimum Navigation Performance
Specification airspace.

The normal crew consisted of two pilots, one flight engineer,
a tactical navigator (TACNAV), a navigator/communicator
(NAVCOM), two acoustic sensor operators and three non-acoustic
sensor operators. The tactical crew compartment was designed to
give the TACNAV a view of the NAVCOM, acoustic sensor
operators' and non-acoustic sensor operators' stations thereby
optimizing mission coordination (CP-140 Aurora/CP-140A Arcturus
Basic Aircraft Systems, 2002).

Figure 1 shows the exterior layout of the aircraft. Figure 2 shows the
general interior layout of the aircraft.

NFIMP Equipment
The AIMP Master Implementation Plan directed that "[t]he AIMP
acquisition process will emphasise the competitive selection of
non-developmental items/off-the-shelf solutions…" (Master Implementation Plan,
2001). The NFIMP modification followed this direction in that the upgrade was
an integrated suite of "off-the-shelf" hardware, with custom software running in
the four CDUs. Much of the equipment was available on the civil market,

7

Figure 1: CP-140 Exterior Arrangement
Taken from CP-140 Aurora/CP-140A Arcturus Basic Aircraft Systems, 2002.

8

Figure 2: CP-140 Interior Arrangement
Taken from CP-140 Aurora/CP-140A Arcturus Basic Aircraft Systems, 2002.
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although some systems contained military-specific items. Individual systems are
briefly discussed below with increased detail, a system architecture diagram and
cockpit layout contained in the appendix.

EGI. Two identical EGIs were the primary attitude and navigation
sources for the system. Each was composed of a laser-ring-gyroscope inertial
navigation system integrated with a military code capable Global Position System
(GPS). The EGIs were receiver autonomous integrity monitoring capable, and
had been installed in large numbers by the United States (US) Air Force.

Avionics Management System. The avionics management system (AMS)
formed the heart of the NFIMP modification. The AMS consisted of four Military
Standard (MIL-STD)-1553B networked CDUs, installed at the left and right pilot,
TACNAV and NAVCOM stations. The CDU managed and controlled most of the
new systems, communicated with the legacy mission computer and displayed
flight, navigation, and systems information graphically. The CDU hardware was
a derivative of other military CDUs, running all new software. The AMS software
was capable of flight planning, providing departure, en route and approach
guidance and sending steering commands to the AFDS.

Electronic Flight Display System. New electronic flight director indicators
(EFDI) and electronic horizontal situation indicators (EHSI) were installed at the
left and right pilots' station as form-fit replacements for the original
10

electromechanical displays. An EHSI was installed at the NAVCOM station.
Each station had its own Display Control Panel (DCP) for managing its displays.
The displays were commercially available 10 centimetre active matrix liquid
crystal, and were completely interchangeable. The combination of the displays
and DCPs was called the electronic flight display system (EFDS).

Autopilot Flight Director System. The new autopilot flight director system
(AFDS) provided the full functionality of the old autopilot including heading and
attitude hold, control wheel steering, altitude hold, and heading select, plus new
approach modes, coupled navigation, altitude select and airspeed hold modes.
The AFDS also incorporated a full range of flight director functions. It had been
specifically designed to act as a replacement for the existing P-3 autopilot, and
had been fielded by the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force
and US Customs Service in their P-3s. Part of this modification was a pair of
commercially available air data computers (ADC) used to provide digital air data
to the AFDS.

ACAS. A new military enhanced ACAS was installed, along with a new
identification friend or foe (IFF) transponder. The ACAS information was
displayed on a new, traffic advisory/resolution advisory/vertical speed indicator
(TA/RA/VSI) display at each pilot's station. The TA/RA/VSI indicator was a
form-fit replacement for the original vertical speed indicator. This system had
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been successfully installed on the Canadian CC-130 Hercules aircraft fleet
without the enhanced capability enabled.

Radar Altimeters. A pair of low-probability of intercept radar altimeters
replaced those already installed in the CP-140. The radar altimeters had been
installed previously on US Navy P-3s, however only as a single system rather
than as a pair.

Procurement Strategy
The AIMP was divided into 23 sub-projects, each with its own approval
process and financial arrangements. These sub-projects were then clustered
into capability groups. The NFIMP was the second capability group, composed
of two sub-projects, one of which was made up of two sub-sub-projects.
Although more complex to manage, a major reason this approach was used for
the AIMP was to allow funding to be approved in smaller increments. This had
the collateral benefit of reducing the apparent financial footprint of the overall
AIMP. The two major fiscal mechanisms used to pay for the AIMP were the NP,
and CP programs.

The NP program was the mechanism through which the DND maintained
existing equipment and capability. Its stated purpose is below:
The National Procurement Program … [was] allocated for the
centrally managed acquisition of material and services (excluding
12

realty assets) required to support equipment, services and systems
in the DND inventory. … projects shall not create a new or
improved capability [italics added] (VCDS National Procurement
Prioritization Process, 2004).

The DND acquired new or improved capabilities through the CP program.
The CP program differed from the NP program in that:
…these projects must be for the acquisition of:
1.

New equipment/systems (assets);

2.

For life extension (beyond one year); and,

3.

Capability enhancement of existing assets. (VCDS

Vote 5 - Capital Program, 2004)

Each piece of equipment within NFIMP was acquired via one of the two
programs or a combination of both. Expenditures to acquire improved capability
were only allowed where that capability had been identified as part of the CP
portion of the program. In the case of NP funded systems, improved or
additional capability could only be acquired incidentally, where a modern system
had inherently better performance than the legacy equipment it was replacing, or
where the contractor offered the capability at no additional cost.

In a parallel effort to limit the cost of the NFIMP, and to reduce the crown's
risk in the program overall, the NFIMP modification was a fixed-price contract.
13

Although this sort of fiscal security added a premium to the initial contract price, it
was attractive in the way it limited the likelihood of large cost over-runs which
could jeopardize later stages of the AIMP.
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2.

Execution
The bulk of the AIMP funding came from the NP program. Specific

capabilities such as the GPS capability of the EGIs and the ACAS had been
funded through national programs designed to deploy new capabilities across all
DND fleets. These systems were the only two of the entire NFIMP funded
through the CP.

The restrictions against capability improvement contained in the NP policy
had several consequences for the NFIMP, only some of which were apparent
during the planning and engineering stages of the program. The first of these
consequences was that the contractor was able to include unsolicited capability
increases in their program proposal to improve its competitiveness, highlighting
in their program proposal where they would exceed the established, validated
and approved requirements laid out for the program. For example, in their
technical proposal the contractor stated that the replacement AFDS "significantly
exceed[ed]" the requirement to functionally replace the existing autopilot (BAE
Systems Canada, 2000). This sort of proposal, once made by the contractor,
could be accepted by DND and incorporated into the contract and program.

The second consequence was that the DND was unable to allocate any
funds to obtain what were considered to be the standard capabilities of the day.
Additional capabilities such as vertical navigation for the autopilot, a high degree
15

of display integration, radio altimeter altitude hold and compliance with modern
standards such as reduced vertical separation minimums were not approved.
Even had the cost of a new capability been negligible within the scope of the
entire AIMP or even the NFIMP, the DND could not specifically fund it.

Possibly the greatest consequence of the NP restrictions was not
apparent until the flight test program was underway. Firm limitations on which
equipment could be replaced or added to the system, driven by the NP
restrictions, had encouraged the contractor to integrate new equipment with the
legacy equipment remaining in the aircraft. In many cases this proved to be an
difficult engineering exercise. When the modern digital equipment used the
information provided by legacy analogue equipment, the results were often
disappointing.

The inflexible restrictions on how program funds could be expended
caused a number of problems for the entire program team. They resulted in a
significant delay in the final product being released for operational use and
considerable inefficiencies in the allocation of engineering resources. The overall
price to DND of the restriction is difficult to quantify, because of the constraints
discussed earlier. In almost any environment, the cost of the first 24 months of a
36 month program running approximately 100% over schedule would be
considerable.

16

Unsolicited Capability
The contractor team drew upon their experience with a similar modification
they had designed and installed in the US Customs Service P-3B fleet when
designing for the NFIMP (BAE Systems Canada, 2000). Technical risk within the
program was reduced by the extensive use of non-developmental equipment,
with several components having been previously installed on other P-3 or military
fleets. Although the CDU and its AMS software were developmental items, the
hardware had a long pedigree of successful progenitors, and the contractor had
extensive experience with military and commercial AMS software for them.

One aspect of the contractor's bid that enhanced its attractiveness to the
DND was that it contained a number of unsolicited capabilities or capabilities that
would exceed stated requirements. Much of this supplemental capability was
inherent in modern avionics and was not expected to add significant complexity
to the modification. Naturally, this supplemental capability was attractive to the
DND, thus it was included in the contract when it was awarded.

Vertical Navigation
Vertical Navigation (VNAV) was a common feature in modern flight
management systems when the NFIMP modification was designed. VNAV would
be a new capability for the CP-140 fleet, potentially reducing workload throughout
all non-tactical phases of flight. Despite its advantages, this capability had not
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been established as a requirement, thus there was no CP funding allocated. The
contractor had implemented VNAV in some of its other products however,
presumably to the satisfaction of its customers and certainly to that of regulators,
and offered the capability as an enhancement to its technical proposal. It was
included in the system specification as simply "[t]he navigation system should
provide en route Vertical Navigation" (CP-140 NFIMP Navigation System
Specification, 2003).

In Advisory Circular 20-129, the Federal Aviation Administration described
VNAV equipment as:
… provid(ing) vertical path guidance computed as deviation from a
desired ascending or descending path to a specified altitude at a
waypoint. Vertical guidance is generally provided as a linear
deviation from the desired track defined by a line joining two
waypoints with specified altitude or as a vertical angle from a
specified waypoint. Such a system may be enhanced by inclusion
of secondary inputs such as optimized climb or descent profiles,
vertical acceleration and true airspeed. The desired vertical path
may be pilot selectable or may be determined by the VNAV
computer by computations based on the altitudes associated with
successive waypoints. (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988).

18

A simple VNAV capability was embodied in the NFIMP modification by
allowing the AMS to send altitude data to the AFDS. By comparing the current
system altitude to the altitude on the TO waypoint in the active flight plan, the
AFDS commanded a level off without control over the aircraft's power setting.
When passing the TO waypoint, the system would annunciate "SEQUENCE
WPT" on the EFDI, cycle to the next waypoint in the flight plan, and then steer
toward it. This function was less complex than the VNAV functions available on
more integrated cockpits, but a similar system had been successfully installed in
the CC-130 Hercules Avionics Upgrade Program (AUP), also without aircraft
power control.

One of the primary motivators for the automation of cockpit functions was
that of workload reduction (Wiener & Nagel,1988). Allowing the aircraft to climb
or descend itself to an assigned altitude would free the pilots to carry out other
tasks or to devote more time to supervision of the flight as a whole, thus
enhancing safety and effectiveness. Successfully implementing this functionality
had proven a difficult task to avionics designers though. A 1999 study of the
Aviation Safety Reporting System showed that 63% of "pilot-cockpit interaction
issues" were with the VNAV functions (Vakil and Hansman in Sherry, et al,
2001). Although the VNAV capabilities of the NFIMP systems were much
simpler than those ascribed to VNAV systems by the Federal Aviation
Administration and those in the 1999 study, they proved equally prone to
confusion.
19

In the NFIMP modification, the VNAV capability was controlled exclusively
through the AMS software in the CDU, with vertical guidance information
available on the EHSI and AFDS mode annunciations on the EFDI and AFDS
control panel. Sherry et al (2002) identified two characteristics of a successful
AMS interface; first, that it not force the pilot to reformulate tasks into alternate or
sub-tasks the AMS does support; and second, that the actions required to
command the tasks can be accessed using visual cues rather than memory and
training. The NFIMP AMS software did not possess either of these
characteristics.

Commanding a VNAV climb or descent required a modification to the
waypoints in the active flight plan. First, the crew would need to decouple the
AFDS from the AMS guidance and either fly the aircraft manually or engage an
altitude or heading hold mode. Modifying the waypoint took 6 keystrokes to
access the flight plan menus, disengage the active flight plan, select the
appropriate waypoint, and then access the waypoint altitude attribute. The new
target altitude could then be entered. The operator would need to move back up
two levels of the menu structure, re-engage the flight plan and finally re-couple
the AFDS to AMS guidance. The pilot would then need to adjust the aircraft
power setting or attitude to start a climb or descent. If a change in power setting
was to be used, the AFDS had to be set into an airspeed hold mode for it to
command a pitch change.
20

When the AFDS detected that the aircraft was approaching the target
altitude, it would begin to command a level off, and an "ALT SEL" indication on
the AFDS control panel and EFDI would cycle to "ALT". As the primary cockpit
altimeters functioned independently of the digital air data system, it was unlikely
that the selected altitude would exactly match the final altitude shown on the
pilot's altimeter, thus forcing the pilot to adjust the final level altitude. In any
case, the pilot would be required to adjust his power setting if he wished to
maintain his desired airspeed.

In the event that the target altitude was not captured before the AMS
cycled to the next waypoint, the system would remain in the climb or descent the
pilot originally set up without any specific annunciation. The "ALT SEL"
indications on the AFDS control panel and EFDI would simply disappear, along
with the vertical guidance on the EHSI. Without pilot intervention, the aircraft
would either hit the ground or climb as high as it could.

When ground tested, the VNAV capability was found to be unacceptable
for operational use (Systems Integration Laboratory Human Factors Evaluation,
2002). The user interface was not intuitive and required operators to know upon
which menu page the various functions resided. The programming process was
prone to error and had little capability to trap mistakes as they were entered. The
poor cues it provided to pilots about system status and intentions made
21

confusion in the cockpit likely, and caused great concerns about the overall
safety of the VNAV capability for use. Advisory Circular 20-129 was also cited to
provide additional support to the observations.

Having been proposed in the contractors bid submission, there were no
specific requirements identified for the design or utility of the VNAV capability.
Without a testable specification, based on established and approved operational
requirements, the DND could only accept what the contractor provided as long as
overriding airworthiness standards were met.

The addition of a dual-function altitude selector/alerter system was
suggested to resolve this deficiency (Systems Integration Laboratory Human
Factors Evaluation, 2002). This sort of device had been used on the similar
CC-130 AUP modification, with full fleet implementation. Other options included
significantly re-designing the AMS interface or enabling the system to provide an
additional warning if a target altitude were missed. Program managers were
unable to pay for an altitude selector because of the restriction against adding
new capability, in the form of a vertical control for the autopilot, to the aircraft
using NP funds.

Program management staff was hesitant to make changes to the system
based on ground test alone. The test crew had limited training and exposure to
the system in a lab environment, and were unable to provide a constructive
22

solution to the problem based on their incomplete evaluation. The decision was
made to wait until flight test results were available. Unfortunately, problems with
the ADC-AFDS integration prevented meaningful flight test of the system before
April 2005.

The test team had made several recommendations to improve the
capability enough to allow it to be fielded. Key amongst them was the addition of
an altitude selector/alerter. If the VNAV capability is found unacceptable when
flight tested in spring 2005, it will be very late in the already delayed program
schedule to make significant changes to the design. Considering that contractual
acceptance of the prototype aircraft had been planned for mid-2003 (AIMP
5-Year Master Schedule, 2002), few schedule and cost effective options will
remain to fix the problem. Even if there are NP funds remaining in the budget,
the program will not be able to spend them on this new capability. The most
likely outcome in the event of an unacceptable finding will be removal of the
capability.

Removing the VNAV capability from the CDU would require further
engineering effort. The total amount of time and money expended in producing,
testing and subsequently removing the VNAV capability from the NFIMP
modification would be difficult to capture. Whether VNAV is finally removed or
not, the exercise had expended resources that could have been better put to use
in other areas of the program.
23

By not writing requirements and specifications for the supplemental
capabilities offered by the contractor, the DND had few courses of action
available when the implementation did not match expectations or needs. As no
funds could be expended to improve them, the contractor was not willing to
modify them to the meet the DND's desires. Whenever a contractor offers
supplemental capability, the DND must analyse the capability, and write
specifications to ensure the final product will meet its needs.

Modern Capability Requires Modern Standards
The definition of what would constitute improved or new capability was
necessarily open to interpretation. Acquisition professionals needed to be able to
apply it to all the equipment the DND could buy. A conservative interpretation of
this definition was applied to the NFIMP in an effort to control costs.

Although the motives were laudable, in assuming that what was
acceptable on the legacy aircraft would continue to be acceptable on a modified
aircraft program staff created a situation where the interaction between new and
old systems combined to put additional demands on equipment and its operators.

Electronic Flight Display Size
The CP-140 NFIMP EFDS Functional and Performance Requirements
Specification (2003)dictated that the new displays maintain the existing "T"
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configuration of the instrument panel. This specification was included to reduce
re-training and cockpit modification costs. It also prohibited the contractor from
suggesting a less conventional but perhaps more effective configuration, possibly
similar to the large screen, side-by-side arrangement that had been selected for
the US Customs Service P-3B modification. A secondary consequence was of
reducing the likelihood of any of the remaining instruments being moved.

The EFDS System Specification also dictated that the displays would
incorporate the functions of the legacy Navigation Advisory panel and Marker
Beacon lights. The Navigation Advisory panel had served to let each pilot know
the status of the various radio navigation aids and other navigation systems.
Figure 3 is an illustration of the panel showing the range of annunciations it
provided.

In addition to the Navigation Advisory Panel and the Marker Beacons, the

Figure 3: Legacy Navigation Advisory Panel
Taken from CP-140 Aurora/CP-140A Arcturus Basic Aircraft
Systems, 2002.
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EFDS was specified to display information provided by the EGIs, navigation
waypoint information, operating limits, and system status (CP-140 NFIMP EFDS
System Specification, 2003). The EFDS was also the only readily available
location upon which to display AFDS and other important system messages. All
of this information was in addition to the flight and navigation information already
presented on the legacy flight director indicator and horizontal situation indicator.
The display of multiple, important annunciations and indicators was constrained
to a pair of displays with "a minimum Active Image Display area 10 centimetres
high and 10 centimetres wide" (CP-140 NFIMP EFDS System Specification,
2003).

Although the new EFDS was not unavoidably constrained to the footprint
of the legacy indicators, the size and layout specifications made identically sized
replacements an obvious and cost-saving choice. In isolation, this would seem
to be a reasonable set of specifications to use and it would certainly be in line
with the "no new capability" direction. When one considers the volume of new
information to be presented on the EFDS, questions about the suitability of 10 cm
displays begin to surface.

Two years before the beginning of flight test, problems with clutter on the
EHSI were identified. Specifically, too many data elements were being displayed
on it (Systems Integration Laboratory Human Factors Evaluation, 2002). The
recommendations at the time were to include a de-clutter function, reduce the
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size of some elements, eliminate other elements or use colour to improve the
ease with which pilots could discern required information from the EHSI. Only
the font size was decreased in an attempt to reduce clutter prior to flight testing.

The AFDS had significant capability beyond that of the legacy ASW-31
autopilot, installed in the 1970's. The ASW-31 was a simple autopilot capable of
barometric altitude hold, heading select and hold via a moveable indicator on the
horizontal situation indicator, and had an analogue yaw damper. The new AFDS
was able to perform these three simple tasks, plus a relatively standard set of
modern functions such as altitude select, airspeed hold and couple to radio
navigation aids or steering commands from the AMS. This greatly increased
level of automation in the cockpit made pilot awareness of the system's current
state and goals much more important (Sarter & Woods, 1992). The control head
for the new AFDS provided little information about the current modes of the
system, and was positioned at the aft edge of the centre pedestal near the
location of the legacy panel (see figure A-2), far outside of either pilot's primary or
secondary field of view (General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 2000).

Without adding an additional autopilot status panel to the cockpit, arguably
an increased capability, the only location available for status display was the
EFDS. The design intent was to occupy the top lines of the EFDI with AFDS
annunciations. Figure 4 shows the available display fields on the EFDI. Table 1
indicates in which field annunciations from the AFDS would appear.
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Figure 4: EFDI Display Fields
Taken from CMC Electronics Human Interface
Specification, 2005

Table 1: AFDS Display Fields
Display Object
EFDI Field
AFDS Status
AT0
AFDS Roll Modes
AT1
AFDS Pitch Modes
AT2
AFDS Faults

AT3
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The EFDI needed to display a great deal of information in a manner
conducive to quick and accurate assimilation by the pilots. Figure 5 shows a
sample co-pilot EFDI screen when the AFDS was in altitude hold mode,
controlled by the pilot, with the flight director coupled to AMS steering
commands.

The flight test crew identified numerous AFDS modal awareness problems
when they became confused in flight or had to carefully analyse the status of the
AFDS (Post Flight Report #10, 2004). Screen layouts from other aircraft with

Figure 5: Sample EFDI Screen
Taken from CMC Electronics Human Interface
Specification, 2005
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similar and more capable autopilots were analysed, including the Airbus 320,
CC-130 AUP, and C-130J, and modifications were suggested. During this
process, it became clear to the team that a larger display or dedicated AFDS
status display in the primary field of view would provide a better solution.

The primary mechanism through which the ASW-31 had communicated
faults to the pilots was through flashing the red, radar altimeter - altitude warning
system (RAAWS) flashers mounted on the left and right glare shields in the pilots'
primary field of view, shown in the appendix. The RAAWS flashed when the
aircraft descended below a selected altitude on the radar altimeter or when there
had been an abnormal AFDS disconnection.

The ASW-31 had not been equipped with a dedicated audible alerter. It
did however make an audible "click" when the magnetically held switches on the
control panel were released as a mode was disengaged. Pilots used this
incidental auditory indication to augment the flashing RAAWS lights to alert them
when the autopilot was disengaged.

The heavy use of the EFDS for communicating information to the pilot,
despite its display area being the same as the legacy displays, contributed to
AFDS modal awareness deficiencies that confused a highly trained flight test
crew. This was combined with the loss of an undocumented legacy
annunciation, the disengagement "click" of the ASW-31, to make AFDS modal
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awareness a significant issue for the modification. Several iterations of display
arrangements were designed, but no satisfactory solution had been identified by
the end of April 2005.

Integration of Old and New Equipment
Wherever possible, old components were integrated with new
components. They often remained as data sources for the new systems, or were
activated by the new systems. The result was frequently disappointing when the
output characteristics of the old equipment didn't meet the requirements of the
new systems.

AFDS Integration
The AFDS had been previously installed in the P-3Ks of the Royal New
Zealand Air Force, the P-3Bs of the Royal Australian Air Force and the P-3Bs of
the US Customs Service. It had been designed to be a drop-in replacement for
older P-3 autopilots and used a number of the same sensors and control
actuators. An extensive development program had been carried out to ensure
the system would work well within the basic P-3 envelope (Jackson, 2002), with
satisfactory results. Although there was a great degree of commonality between
those previous implementations and that for the CP-140 (CMC Electronics AFDS
Equivalence, 2003), all three had different interfaces with the other aircraft
systems. In the case of the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand
Air Force, analogue interfaces conveyed radio navigation aid information to the
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autopilot computer whereas the US Customs Service had digital radio navigation
aid receivers. The NFIMP modification sent data to the AFDS from the original
navigation aid receivers that had undergone an analogue-digital conversion
inside the EFDS. All three implementations had digital ADCs, using the original
pitot and static ports, providing air data to the AFDS. In the case of the NFIMP,
the ADCs were commercially available and had been previously installed in
helicopters (BAE Systems Canada, 2000). Despite the confidence of the entire
program team in the AFDS itself, its data sources were an untried combination.

The integration of the AFDS proved to be one of the most problematic
portions of the entire NFIMP. Like all systems, it had been tested as much as
practical in the Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL) and on the ground prior to
flight test. Lessons learned in previous installations had been incorporated into
the software and other elements. Although a moderate number of envelope
expansion test points had been programmed (CMC Electronics Flight Test Plan,
2004), the risk of errant gains or AFDS malfunction was thought to be low.

Early AFDS flight tests were plagued by uncommanded disconnects
whenever the pilot applied a small amount of positive or negative normal
acceleration in a turn or wings level pull up or push over (Post Flight Report #5,
2004). All aircraft systems appeared to be serviceable, however the system
could not be employed in any turn or moderately aggressive attitude change.
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An analysis of fault code data recorded by the flight test instrumentation
indicated a problem with one of the normal accelerometers that fed data into the
AFDS. It was a legacy component, unaffected by the NFIMP modification.
Ground checks of the accelerometer showed it to be within specifications and
functioning normally. In an attempt to avoid delays to the flight test program, the
accelerometer was ordered replaced as a troubleshooting step and the problem
never reoccurred.

The aircraft had no autopilot malfunctions prior to induction into the NFIMP
modification line, thus it is likely that the accelerometer was presenting adequate
data for the legacy autopilot. That same component, which had ground checked
serviceable, was now not up to the task. There would be no indication for frontline maintenance personnel to suspect it were a similar failure to occur in normal
use, as the flight test instrumentation would not be available on production
aircraft. The long-term impact of this new potential problem on the availability
rate of the system was not known.

As the AFDS test program carried on, it became apparent to crews that
the AFDS was not flying the aircraft in wings-level balanced flight (Post Flight
Report #8, 2004). The aircraft appeared to be in a slight, steady-heading sideslip
with the left wing down. Further analysis of flight data indicated a +/- 0.5° roll
oscillation with a period of approximately 5.5 seconds (CMC Electronics Ground
Test Report, 2005). Following inconclusive ground checks, a detailed analysis of
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the databus traffic recorded by the flight test instrumentation showed that the
problem could lie in the hydraulic actuator systems in the empennage and wings
of the aircraft that translated the AFDS commands into the hydraulic actions
necessary to move the control surfaces.

Although the legacy systems were serviceable by established on-aircraft
maintenance standards, they were not able to function properly when connected
to the new AFDS. The contractor carried out an extensive series of ground tests
using non-standard techniques, confirming that both the aileron and rudder
hydraulic actuator systems required replacement (CMC Electronics Ground Test
Report, 2005). The aileron and rudder hydraulic actuator systems had not yet
been replaced by April 2005, so the correctness of the contractor's conclusions
had not been verified.

The DND must now ascertain the impact of this finding. It may be
required to order extra testing or the overhaul of all the aileron and rudder
hydraulic actuator systems, at a significant cost. Additionally, maintenance
manuals and technician training will require changes to include these newly
discovered serviceability criteria. Although the new AFDS did not specifically
require the modification of the remaining components of the flight control system,
there will be at least a short-term cost to make equipment that meets current
requirements compatible with the newly installed AFDS.
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These two maintenance problems did not exist with the legacy autopilot
system, but no cost neutral solution had been found to deal with them.
Maintenance and engineering effort was expended during the flight test program
to solve them, but both the long and short-term costs remained unknown.

There is significant technical and schedule risk whenever modern
equipment is expected to function properly with older, legacy equipment. A
careful analysis of these risks must be made, and allowances for the re-work of
the legacy equipment must be made both in schedule and effort.

The altitude hold capability of the AFDS was gradually explored during the
flight test program. One operationally important use for the altitude hold was
while conducting low-level operations over the ocean. CP-140 crews routinely
operated as low as 100 feet above the ocean's surface in all weather conditions
(Statement of Operating Intent, 2000). The legacy autopilot had been used to
maintain aircraft altitude during these manoeuvres. Operational techniques had
been developed to ensure a safe descent from en route altitudes, allowing 60°
bank turns to be performed just above the ocean's surface. It was essential that
the new AFDS be capable of performing the same task.

At moderate altitudes, the AFDS showed itself to be sluggish in
maintaining altitude (Post Flight Report #13, 2004). There were constant pitch
oscillations while the AFDS was holding an assigned altitude. The aircraft would
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exceed the +/-50 foot altitude band that the system was specified to maintain
(CP-140 NFIMP Automatic Flight Control System Specification, 2003). The
AFDS would frequently not engage altitude hold mode when commanded,
despite all the preconditions being met according to pilot indications.
Performance was lacklustre and "undesirable" (Post Flight Report #13, 2004).

Despite this poor performance, the flight test team continued to try to use
the AFDS in all its modes. A seemingly unrelated problem was found when
attempting a coupled Instrument Landing System approach; the AFDS was
unable to couple to the navigation aid. The system would immediately
disconnect and provide an AFDS error message (Post Flight Report #5, 2004).

An analysis of the ADC data showed that the signal contained a great deal
of apparently random noise. Although this noise had been observed in earlier
analysis, it had not been considered significant as the magnitude of the noise
was generally less than +/-20 feet. A two-minute sample of ADC data, recorded
by flight test instrumentation during straight, level, unaccelerated flight is shown
in Figure 6.

This noise was interpreted by the ADCs as large altitude rates. These
high rates would cause failures of the various crosschecks between the ADC
outputs, often causing the AFDS to disconnect. As many of the AFDS control
outputs were scheduled according to airspeed, this noise was also causing poor
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Air Data Computer 1
Original Configuration
12,100
12,090

Pressure Altitude (feet)

12,080
12,070
12,060
12,050
12,040
12,030
12,000 feet Pressure Altitude
250 knots indicated airspeed
Altitude Hold engaged
10 Hertz sample rate

12,020
12,010
12,000
00:00

00:30

01:00

01:30

02:00

Maneuver Time (mm:ss)

Figure 6: Air Data, Original Configuration
performance. Further analysis by the contractor showed the frequency of the
noise to be at approximately the same frequency as the rotation of the propellers.
Ground tests involving starting and shutting down of engines with pitot-static
system ports blocked and unblocked confirmed that the airflow behind the
propellers was causing the disturbance. The static ports were located behind the
main cabin door, aft of the wing.

The new ADCs used the existing aircraft pitot-static system by tapping into
the co-pilot's side. The pilot's side remained untouched. The high frequency
noise had always been present in the system; it had simply not mattered to the
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legacy, analogue avionics. In the early 1990's, restrictors had been placed into
the static system to resolve a problem with the aircraft oscillating unacceptably
when in Altitude Hold (CP-140 Porpoising Problem Investigation, 1991). These
had been removed during the NFIMP modification as a solution to that problem
had been incorporated into the AFDS itself.

Ground tests showed that re-insertion of the restrictors would remove the
high frequency components of the noise, and software in the ADCs could be
modified to remove the lower frequency components of the noise. This
combination of software filters and mechanical restrictors inserted into the
system were intended to reduce the noise on the signal sufficiently to allow
altitude capture and instrument landing system glideslope capture functions to
proceed, without introducing other unsatisfactory characteristics. Flight tests
later proved that the noise level had been sufficiently reduced. Figure 7
presents air data recorded during a manoeuvre identical to that in Figure 6, after
the ADC software had been changed and the restrictors re-inserted into the static
lines in the positions defined during previous testing (CP-140 Porpoising Problem
Investigation, 1991).

The re-introduction of the static restrictors in their original locations had
resolved the noise problem, but there were an unacceptable number of
uncommanded AFDS disconnects during subsequent flight testing when the
aircraft was aggressively manoeuvred (Post Flight Report #22, 2005). Flight test
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Air Data Computer 1
Modified Configuration
12,100
12,090

Pressure Altitude (feet)
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12,070
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12,050
12,040
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250 knots indicated airspeed
Altitude Hold engaged
10 Hertz sample rate

12,020
12,010
12,000
00:00

00:30

01:00

01:30

02:00

Maneuver Time (mm:ss)

Figure 7: Air Data, Modified Configuration
data analysis showed a new differential between ADC 1 and ADC 2, manifested
as a lag. Figure 8 shows a high speed, wings level pull-up manoeuvre where the
different altitudes being reported by the two ADCs are shown. During this
relatively steady manoeuvre, the altitude difference was up to 65 ft. In
aggressive pull-ups or other rapid altitude changes, this difference would
increase to approximately 200 feet.

The AFDS compared data from the two ADCs, disconnecting whenever an
altitude difference of more than 100 feet was reported. This safety check was
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Air Data System Lag with
Legacy Restrictors Installed
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Air Data Computer #1
Air Data Computer #2
Speeds up to 400 knots indicated
airspeed.
Approximately 2.0 G wings level pull-up
20 Hertz sample rate
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Reported Pressure Altitude (feet)
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12,200
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00:00
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Figure 8: Air Data System Lag with Legacy Restrictors Installed
triggering the uncommanded disconnects. An examination of the different
positions of the restrictors in the ADC 1 static line and the ADC 2 static line
showed a volumetric imbalance between the two systems. There was a larger
volume of air between ADC 2 and its restrictor that was responsible for the lag.
The intended solution, balancing the volume of the two systems, had not been
flight tested by the end of April 2005.

The static air pressure sensing system of the CP-140 had a proven track
record, as did the ADC selected for the NFIMP modification. Changes to the
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static air system had been minimized in an attempt to reduce technical risk.
Despite this mitigation, their unacceptable combined performance with the AFDS
in actual flight conditions could not have been predicted by lab or static ground
tests. These difficulties are typical of the sorts of problems one should expect
and plan for when dealing with a complex interaction of new and old systems.

Display of Distance Measuring Equipment Range
One of the intended uses of the SIL was to "integrate and test the NFIMP
systems" (BAE Systems Canada, 2000). Approximately one year before the
beginning of flight testing, a problem was identified with the display of data from
the legacy AN/ARN-504 tactical air navigation radio set (TACAN) on the EFDS in
the SIL (NFIMP Problem Report Database, 2005). Specifically, line-of-sight
range data from the distance measuring equipment (DME) was being
misinterpreted by the EFDS, and subsequently presented to the pilot with ten
miles added to the result. This new problem could easily confuse pilots using the
DME for navigation tasks. Table 2 shows the actual and anticipated DME range
displayed, based on SIL testing, when the range was increasing. Table 3 shows
the actual and anticipated DME range displayed when the range was decreasing.

Despite having been found well before the beginning of the flight test
program, the problem was not rectified at that stage. The contractor had queried
members of the flight test team about the relative importance of the problem, who
responded that the severity of the problem depended on the length of time the
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Table 2: Actual Range Increasing and Expected DME Display
Actual Range
Increasing
(nautical miles)
9.8
9.9
10.0
10.1
10.2

Expected DME
Display
9.8
9.9
19.9 briefly, then 10.0
10.1
10.2

Table 3: Actual Range Decreasing and Expected DME Display
Actual Range
Decreasing
(nautical miles)
10.2
10.1
10.0
9.9
9.8
9.7

Expected DME
Display
10.2
10.1
10.0
19.9 briefly, then 9.9
9.8
9.7

erroneous data would be presented. A misleading distance, presented for only a
second would possibly be acceptable, as other aircraft in the Canadian Forces
fleet exhibited this shortcoming (CT-133 Silver Star Aircraft Operating
Instructions, 2002). A longer presentation of incorrect range was unlikely to be
accepted.

During flight test, the full extent of the problem became apparent (Post
Flight Report #1, 2004). Rather than a brief presentation of false data, the DME
would be wrong while the aircraft was in the last half nautical mile of any range
decade. At a nominal cruise speed of 200 knots indicated airspeed at 10,000
feet, heading directly away or toward the ground station, the incorrect range
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would be displayed for approximately 10 seconds. When flying a tangential arc a
fixed radius from a ground station, a frequent practice when instrument flying in
bad weather, the display would be often jump back and forth between correct
and incorrect ranges. The potential for confusion, or certainly at least
annoyance, with this characteristic was significant. Table 4 shows the typical,
actual DME range displayed when the distance was increasing. Table 5 shows
the typical, actual DME range displayed when the distance was decreasing.

The DME data were encoded into a 3-wire synchro signal inside the
TACAN, and sent to the display. Investigation by the contractor determined that
the legacy electromechanical horizontal situation indicator DME display used a
Geneva Gear, similar to the odometer in a car, to display DME data. Any
ambiguity in the synchro signal was resolved by the display, as the mechanical
pins in the gear prevented it from moving non-sequentially. When the synchro
signal, including a small amount of ambiguity, was interpreted by the new EFDS,
the ambiguity remained and was displayed to the pilots.

The TACAN installed in the prototype aircraft was confirmed as being
serviceable and representative of the systems installed in the rest of the fleet.
Analysis by the contractor determined that the ambiguity was an inherent
characteristic of the TACAN that was compensated for within the legacy
horizontal situation indicator DME display. No solution to this problem had been
installed in the prototype aircraft by the end of April 2005.
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Table 4: Actual Range Increasing and Actual Displayed DME
Actual Range
Increasing
(nautical miles)
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.9
10.0
10.1
10.2

Displayed DME
9.3
9.4
19.5
19.6
19.7
19.8
19.9
10.0
10.1
10.2

Table 5: Actual Range Decreasing and Actual Displayed DME
Actual Range
Decreasing
(nautical miles)
10.2
10.1
10.0
9.9
9.8
9.7
9.6
9.5
9.4
9.3

Displayed DME
10.2
10.1
10.0
19.9
19.8
19.7
19.6
19.5
9.4
9.3
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The integration of old and new equipment in an aircraft can be a difficult
engineering task. There will often be systems, such as with the air data system
in the CP-140, where ground tests may not be able to uncover the problem early
in a program. In other cases, the problem may be found early on, but the
solution may prove troublesome to implement. Program managers must keep a
reserve of resources to expend on these types of problems, often uncovered only
near the end of their program schedule.

Suggestions for Future Programs
By restricting the acquisition of new capability with NP program funds, the
DND ensured that the resources required for routine maintenance could be
allocated without a great deal of oversight on how they were spent. Aircraft
engineering officers were thus able to maintain the systems they were
responsible for with a reasonable amount of independence. New capabilities
were only acquired where there was an established, validated requirement,
authorised at the appropriate headquarters level, rather than being haphazardly
acquired through a maintenance process.

A critical part of any large program is a clear articulation of the aim and
objectives. For military aircraft modernisation programs, a statement of the
minimum capability level to be preserved or acquired is also essential. The
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results of this goal setting process must then become a prominent part of all
decisions made regarding the allocation of resources.

When NP funds are used to as part of a large modernisation effort, as was
the case with the NFIMP, program managers should be given an expanded
mandate to bring both the systems and capabilities being modernised up to the
current state of the art, in line with stated program goals. These new capabilities
should not expand the role of the aircraft or enable it to perform significantly
changed missions without specific authorisation through the normal requirements
management process. Provided they don't, program managers should be given
the flexibility to acquire all the up-to-date capability they can, in accordance with
program goals, with the financial resources they've been given.

Managers must be ready to embrace current technology, ideas and
standards when considering new equipment. In doing so, they must be equally
prepared to make up for the loss of some of the qualities inherent in the
equipment being replaced. In the case of the NFIMP, the loss of stabilising
characteristics of the electromechanical displays and the audible disengagement
of autopilot modes had left the updated aircraft with deficiencies. When
considering which equipment to replace or retain, managers should avoid closely
integrating old and new systems, but they must also be prepared to compensate
for the collateral decreases to crew awareness, system stability or overall
airworthiness when old equipment is removed.
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When considering unsolicited capability offered in contractor proposals,
managers must develop detailed requirements for those capabilities, similar to
those developed at the outset of the program. Detailed requirements and
specifications will ensure that any additional capability will benefit operational
flight crews and that engineering effort will not be wasted on marginal
improvements or half-efforts.

Given the problems routinely uncovered in flight test despite significant
amounts of lab and ground testing, a financial and schedule reserve must be
planned to allow issues uncovered during flight testing to be addressed. Without
this reserve, programs will be forced to make unpalatable decisions, likely
sacrificing performance or capability, to resolve problems discovered late in their
schedule.
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3.

Conclusion
The NFIMP modification was intended to update the 25-year old cockpit of

the CP-140 through a combination of system replacements and additions. Strict
regulations governing the allocation of funds to either the acquisition of new
capability or the maintenance of existing capability resulted in a delayed
deployment of the final product with a diminished operational utility compared to
the likely product had a simple cap on total expenditures been enforced.

In submitting a competitive bid for the program, the contractor offered a
significant number of capabilities beyond the minimum called for in the NFIMP
System Specifications. Although unable to specifically authorize additional
expenditures on these extra capabilities, the DND accepted their proposal,
including all the promised extra capabilities. No detailed requirements or
specifications were developed for the extra capabilities.

As the program schedule incurred numerous delays caused by
development and integration problems, it became apparent that continued effort
on these features, deemed non-essential in the earliest stages of program
planning from a military point of view, would further extend the schedule unless
additional resources could be brought to bear on the problems. By eliminating
the extra capability from the final product or reducing it to insignificant utility, the
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DND effectively wasted the effort previously expended on its integration or
development.

Where the extra capability was highly desirable for inclusion in the
modification, as in the case of VNAV, the DND was unable to authorize the
expenditure of additional funds to specifically address those shortcomings.
Instead, overall program schedule was sacrificed to allow technical problems to
be solved with the resources at hand, further delaying the final product.

Without firm, testable requirements and specifications for the extra
capabilities, the DND was left with few mechanisms through which to ensure the
final implementation of the extra capability possessed any particular
characteristics. In the end, it was up to the contractor to determine the final state
of any of the extra capability.

In the process of replacing obsolescent equipment, the DND had an
opportunity to take advantage of current industry standards in avionics.
Technically simple options were available that would have decreased the
workload for crews and increased the overall capability of the NFIMP
modification. These included items such as larger EFDS screens, AFDS
annunciators and altitude selector-alerters. The restriction against increasing
capability with NP program funds prevented such equipment from being included
in the modification.
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By not taking advantage of widely available modern equipment and
options that were standard in other systems, even within the DND aircraft fleet,
the NFIMP modification introduced new shortcomings in the overall system.
Essentially, by incorporating that additional capability which was unavoidable or
included as "exceeding requirements" in the contractor's proposal without looking
to the impact on the whole, the modification created an integrated system that
had new deficiencies from a flight safety or operational effectiveness point of
view.

These new deficiencies required additional effort on the part of the
contractor and the flight test team to rectify. In some cases, the most obvious
and lowest technical risk solution could not be entertained because of the
additional capability it would add. The administrative effort required to justify the
capability was not made. In some cases, the test team recommended the
removal of some of the new capability to ensure that the remaining systems
could be operated safely.

One element of the overall effort to reduce program cost was the retention
of the maximum amount of legacy equipment; the corollary was that the
replacement of equipment that was not yet obsolescent could not be justified.
This resulted in the maintenance of legacy pitot-static instruments in the cockpit,
and all radio navigation receivers in the aircraft.
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The contractor was responsible to integrate their new equipment with that
remaining in the aircraft. Problems were encountered when the outputs of
analogue equipment were to be used by the new digital system. Similarly, the
wide tolerances and inherent stabilizing characteristics of analogue, legacy
equipment were incompatible with the digital computations performed by some of
the modern equipment. These incompatibilities caused a significant amount of
engineering effort to be expended, with accompanying schedule delays.

Had the option existed to simply replace the legacy equipment with
modern equipment with an equivalent function, a cost/benefit analysis could have
been conducted. Considering the marginal acquisition cost of such standard
equipment and the likely reduction in follow-on maintenance costs, the savings in
engineering effort and schedule delay could have made a convincing case for
updates.

Future modernisation programs should have their NP and CP resources
combined and program managers given the authority to allocate funds as
required to achieve program objectives. This will enhance their ability to
maximize the benefits of the program.

Embracing the full range and capability of modern technology will free
managers from the limitations of the systems they are replacing, and will help to
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minimise the shortcomings of the remaining equipment. It may also reduce the
number of integration problems that may not be discovered until late in the
program.

Despite increased fiscal flexibility and the maximisation of new technology,
problems will always be encountered during flight testing, late in the program
schedule. A meaningful reserve should be allocated to deal with these problems,
thus avoiding a trade-off between capability and schedule or costs.

Although it is difficult to assign a dollar cost to the schedule delays and the
engineering effort expended by government personnel, it is not difficult to argue
that the cost of a program being 100% over schedule, with a significant reduction
in final capability, was considerable.
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Adapted from Flight Test Plan and Procedures for the Canadian Forces
CP-140 Aurora Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation Project (CMC
Electronics, 2004).

Overall Modification
The NFIMP system provided the pilot, co-pilot, TACNAV and NAVCOM
with new avionics to maintain and improve current aircraft capabilities and
provide for future growth.

The NFIMP upgrade introduced Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC)
and MIL-STD-1553B databuses as replacements for the existing analogue
system. Dual EGIs provided attitude and position data which were fed using
standard ARINC 429 serial links to the flight displays and navigation data to the
CDUs on the MIL-STD-1553B avionics databus. The CDUs were the bus
bontrollers for the avionics data bus. The CDUs also communicated as receivertransmitters with the CP-140 mission computer, the general purpose digital
computer (GPDC), via the MIL-STD-1553B mission databus. Legacy avionics,
such as very high frequency omni range, instrument landing system, TACAN, low
frequency beacon receivers and compass were integrated into the flight displays
using their existing interface formats (synchros or deviations). When required, the
EFDS converted this analogue information into an ARINC 429 digital format for
use by other NFIMP systems.
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Under failure conditions, the system had graceful degradation
characteristics, with redundancy and reversion modes.

AMS
The AMS provided the core NFI avionics/mission system integration
element. The AMS comprised four identical CDUs and a data loader system
(DLS). Two CDUs resided in the cockpit center pedestal, the third at the
NAVCOM station, and the fourth at the TACNAV station. The DLS was installed
at the NAVCOM station.

The CMA-2082D CDU was an intelligent multiprocessor system that
incorporated a 10-centimetre by 10-centimetre flat panel active matrix liquid
crystal display and associated multifunction key panel. Each CDU provided the
capability to implement all control, display and processing for navigation,
communications and mission system management. Functionally, the CDUs
provided the multifunction operator interface for control of the EGIs, IFF, ACAS
and RAAWS, as well as navigation source selection, civil area navigation, tactical
navigation, database upload/download and editing, the setup and control of flight
plans and tactical patterns, and the display of sensor, navigation and status
information.

The CDUs provided area, vertical and tactical navigation outputs to the
EFDS and AFDS based on the selected navigation source and the active flight
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plan. As well, the CDUs interacted with the GPDC, to provide navigation solution
data and exchange tactical flight data from it.

The DLS provided a medium, which could upload user-specified mission
data into the AMS via a Personal Computer Memory Card International
Association solid-state data transfer medium. Likewise, the DLS provided a
download capability for mission-related and maintenance data. The data loader
was also used to load CDU software and the monthly-produced civilian
navigation database required for worldwide, airways navigation.

EGI
Two EGIs replaced the legacy LN-33 inertial navigation systems and
provided a GPS capability, as well as two GPS antennas and a cryptographic
load panel. They also replaced the rate-of-turn gyroscopes, and provided the
data for the electronic turn/slip inclinometers. The EGI cryptographic load port
provided a load capability for classified GPS cryptographic keys from standard
KYK-13 cryptographic loading devices.

EFDS
An EFDS replaced the existing electro-mechanical primary flight
instruments. It included one EFDI, one EHSI and one DCP installed in each of
the pilot and co-pilot instrument panels. There was also one EHSI and one DCP
installed at the NAVCOM station. The EFDI and EHSI displayed basic EGI
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attitude/heading, flight director bars, lateral and vertical deviations, autopilot
modes, area/tactical navigation information, radio navigation aids bearing
pointers and selected warnings.

The DCP permitted selection of navigation course source, attitude and
heading source, and bearing pointers source at each crew station. The EFDS
also incorporated Map, and Plan modes. This allowed the display of nearby
airports, navigation aids and waypoints based on data provided from the CDU
navigation database.

The EFDS received standby attitude and compass heading inputs as
backup when the selected EGI data were unavailable. The EFDS provided
heading outputs to the Weather Reconnaissance System, and attitude to the
Radar, in accordance with crew selections as per current aircraft operation.

AFDS
The AFDS replaced the existing ASW-31 autopilot/flight director system.
The upgrade included two solid-state rate gyroscope assemblies, an
autopilot/flight director computer and a control panel, which provided for
combined autopilot and flight director selections. The autopilot/flight director
computer interfaced with the existing actuators, accelerometers, trim indicator,
control wheel switches/sensors, RAAWS warning flashers, and hydraulic power
switch. AFDS status and mode annunciations were provided on both the
autopilot control panel and the EFDS.
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The new AFDS provided the full suite of autopilot functions including
heading and attitude hold, control wheel steering, altitude hold, heading select,
approach modes, and coupled navigation. In addition, the AFDS provided altitude
select and airspeed hold modes. The AFDS also incorporated a full range of
flight director functions. All flight director modes could be driven from either Pilot
or co-pilot settings, and could be coupled to the autopilot for lateral and vertical
steering.

ADC
Two ADCs were installed to replace the existing AFDS barometric
controllers, the true airspeed computer and the flight data recorder transducer.
These units were not used to provide information to the primary flight displays.
Primary altitude and airspeed display to the pilot and co-pilot was accomplished
with the existing legacy instruments. The ADCs interfaced with the existing dualoutput temperature sensor, and static and pitot pressure inputs, to provide
ARINC-429 air data for use by the AFDS and CDU. Barometric corrections for
the ADCs could be entered on any of the CDUs. The CDUs accepted data from
the ADC and routed true airspeed and outside air temperature to the GPDC via
the mission data bus, altitude and airspeed to the IFF and outside air
temperature to the flight data recorder via the avionics data bus. The ADC
transmitted data directly to the flight data recorder for altitude recordings. The
ADCs were also used by the CDU as the altitude sensor for the VNAV guidance.
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RAAWS
A redundant RAAWS was installed to replace the legacy AN/APN-511
RAAWS. Each RAAWS was a stand-alone unit, including a height indicator
equivalent to the indicator currently used on the CP140A, a new transceiver
sensor, two antennas for each transceiver (total of 4 installed for the dual
system) and interfaces to the legacy cockpit flasher and intercom system. This
system provided the same functionality as the legacy CP-140 RAAWS. The new
system provided a low-probability-of-intercept capability and full performance up
to 35,000 feet. Although, the height indicator only displayed altitude to 5,000 feet,
the CDU could display the full altitude range. The radar altimeter interfaced with
the CDU, which in turn provided the data to the mission computer. The CDU also
used these data to inhibit VNAV guidance below 1000 ft above ground level.

The radar altimeter provided data to the ACAS to inhibit descent RA’s
when the aircraft was at low altitudes. The radar altimeter did not support
coupled vertical steering (AMS or AFDS).

ACAS
The ACAS included an ACAS processor, two TA/RA/VSI displays (one at
each of the pilot positions), and two (top and bottom) directional antennas. The
displays served two purposes – to indicate Traffic Advisories and Resolution
Advisories, as well as indicate vertical speed, replacing the existing vertical
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speed indicators. The ACAS processor used the interrogation replies received
from other transponder-equipped aircraft in the vicinity to determine their position
and potential to cause collision. As the potential to cause a conflict increased, the
processor used the transponder data of the intruder aircraft to predict the time to,
and the separation at, the intruder's closest point of approach. Had the ACAS
predicted that certain safe boundaries might be violated, it would issue a Traffic
Advisory to alert the crew that closing traffic was in the vicinity. If the intruder
continued to close, the ACAS would issue a Resolution Advisory to obtain or
maintain safe vertical separation between own aircraft and the intruder. The
Resolution Advisory provided both a visual and audio commands to the crew that
would resolve the conflict if acted upon in a timely fashion. The unit included an
“Enhanced” mode with increased range and rendezvous features.

AN/APX-100 Mode S IFF
AN/APX-100 Mode S IFF transponder with embedded Mode 4 replaced
the legacy AN/APX-77 transponder set and KIT-1A. The IFF system included the
legacy IFF antennas and an AN/APX-100 transponder. The transponder was
capable of receiving and decoding interrogation challenges for the selective
identification feature Modes 1, 2, 3/A, C, and Mode 4 (or National cryptography),
as well as Mode S Level 2. It also featured an ACAS capability and an embedded
Mode 4 cryptographic module. The integrated Mode 4 module eliminated the
need for an external KIT-1C cryptographic computer. The IFF was fully integrated
with the ACAS (described above). The MIL-STD-1553B interface allowed the
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CDU to provide the primary control interface to the IFF. Switches were installed
in the cockpit centre pedestal to provide Mode 4 code hold, emergency IFF, and
Mode 3 identification functions.
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Figure A - 1: System Architecture
Taken from CMC Electronics Flight Test Plan, 2004.
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Figure A - 2: NFIMP Equipment Cockpit Layout
Taken from CMC Electronics Flight Test Plan, 2004.
67

EFDI
EHSI
TA/RA/VSI
CDU
Autopilot Control Panel
Radar Altimeter Height Indicator
RAAWS Flasher

Vita
Michael Roy Barker was born in Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada, on 04 July
1973. He joined the Canadian Forces as an Aerospace Engineer in June, 1991
and went to the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario where he
received a Bachelor's of Engineering (Mechanical) in 1995. In 2002 he
graduated from the United States Air Force Test Pilot School as a Flight Test
Engineer before going to work at the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment
in Cold Lake, Alberta in the Multi-Engine Evaluation Flight.

He is currently the Department of National Defence Test Team Lead for
the Navigation and Flight Instruments Modernisation Project Combined Test
Force.

68

